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Mimesis as an epistemological model originated in ancient Greece when artists imitated their masters and followed pre-
established models. Humanism, in turn, rescues this model and improves it: just as Vergil imitated Homer, Dante imitated 
Vergil; if Petrarch sought in the classics the source of inspiration for his poetry, Camões, in turn, makes the sonnets from the 
Italian as his model, to mention a few examples. However, such a procedure did not represent plagiarism, as it was a way to 
honor the masters. This model reached its peak in the 17th century, declining in the following centuries, especially in the 19th 
century. However, with its rupture, the representation models permeated Western culture for centuries were lost, leading 
subjectivity to assume the preponderant role in art. More than a change in the perception of art, there was a change in the 
world's perception that surrounds humanity, whose significant influence was due to photography. 
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A mimese como modelo epistemológico teve sua origem na Grécia antiga, quando os artistas imitavam seus mestres e 
seguiam os modelos preestabelecidos; o Humanismo, por sua vez, resgata esse modelo e o aperfeiçoa: da mesma maneira 
que Virgílio imitou Homero, Dante imitou Virgílio. Petrarca, por exemplo, buscou nos clássicos a fonte de inspiração para 
seus sonetos; Camões, por sua vez, faz dele seu modelo, só para citar alguns exemplos. Tal procedimento, contudo, não 
representava plágio, já que era uma maneira de homenagear os mestres. Tal modelo teve seu apogeu no século XVII, 
entrando em declínio nos séculos seguintes, de modo especial no século XIX. Com seu rompimento, porém, perderam-se 
os modelos de representação que permearam a cultura ocidental por séculos, levando a subjetividade a assumir o papel 
preponderante na arte. Mais do que uma mudança na percepção da arte, verificou-se uma mudança na percepção do 
mundo que cerca o homem, cuja grande influência deveu-se à fotografia. 




1 From Lessing to German romantics 
 
 Breaking barriers: a striking feature of humanity throughout its existence, whether transporting 
gigantic stones – to build pyramids – or exceeding the speed of sound – in an aircraft. Examples 
abound. The human being himself can be considered a barrier overcome within nature because 
possessing a fragile complexion, meeting conditions that would hinder his survival in a hostile 
environment, surrounded by much stronger beings and, apparently, more capable of winning the 
setbacks of evolution. However, the lógos (λόγος) combined with téchne (τέχυη) made the difference, 
causing fragility to become solidity. 
However, the transposed barrier highlighted in this article is neither in the remote past nor in a 
close one. It refers to the rupture of mimesis (μίμησις) as an epistemological value, whose decline 
began to be outlined in an incipient way in the 18th century, improved in the 19th century, and became 
effective in the 20th century. 
From this rupture, it would only be up to the artist to demonstrate his creative genius since his 
artistic work – be it pictorial or poetic – would no longer be linked to tradition but to expression. Besides, 
the relationship established by these two arts, the Ut pictura poesis, was broken. That was put in check, 
already in the 18th century, by Lessing in his work Laocoonte: An essay on the limits of painting and 
poetry, when, in demarcating the boundaries between poetry and painting, he anticipates the break 
between the two artistic expressions, whose interrelation it had been harmonious since the 
Renaissance, as shown by iconologies and emblems (BRANDÃO, 2010a). 
Lessing delimits the field of action of both image and writing to two non-interchangeable 
aspects: time and space. The former would be in charge of poetry, the latter of painting. That, for 
example, “must therefore choose the [moment] one which is most suggestive and from which the 
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preceding and succeeding actions are most easily comprehensible.” (LESSING, 1984, p. 78) Thus, the 
painting must renounce time; ergo, progressive actions cannot be part of its object. Therefore, it must 
be content with activities next to each other or with mere bodies that suggest an action through its 
positions. (LESSING, 1984) 
When writing, it would be necessary to develop the actions that are painted as the reader reads 
(LESSING, 1984), in a continuous act of protension and retention; finally, “we are not able to apprehend 
a text in a single moment” (ISER, 1999, p. 11), as we do with any object. That is because it, as an 
object of perception, becomes evident as a whole since we are before it; the text, in turn, can only be 
apprehended as an “object” in consecutive phases of reading; after all, we are inside it, through reading. 
(ISER, 1999, p. 12) 
Since the end of the 18th century, the concept of μίμησις was being abolished and rejected by 
young German romantics who aimed not only at complete freedom in artistic creation but also at a new 
affirmation of art. No longer explicitly aimed at the mere imitation of nature, but at the spirit’s production 
and reproduction. For example, Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling proposes not the total negation of the 
mimetic principle but its transformation. (GONÇALVES, 2001) In turn, Friedrich Schlegel saw in 
Romanticism a definitive aesthetic change, the central meaning of which would be to free art from its 
mimetic function on nature and its inferior form of apprehending the truth from the consolidation of the 
idea that art is produced by a free and naturally creative subjectivity, at the same time intellectual and 
intuitive, conscious and unconscious of and in his artistic creation. (GONÇALVES, 2001) 
Hegel (1988) also makes a stern criticism of mimesis in his work Aesthetics: Lecture on fine art, 
when addressing its different currents. For the German philosopher, the mimetic epistemological model 
assigns art a purely formal purpose: remaking, with the means available to the artist, what exists in the 
natural world, ergo, that correspondence nature-art “is supposed to afford complete satisfaction.” 
(HEGEL, 1988, p. 41-42)   
However, such efforts are superfluous and “may even be regarded as a presumptuous game 
which falls far short of nature” (HEGEL, 1988, p. 42) because the art “can only produce one-sided 
deceptions, for example, a pure appearance of reality for one sense only, and if it abides by the formal 
aim of mere imitation, it provides not the reality of life but only a pretense of life.” (HEGEL, 1988, p. 42) 
More significant than the mere pleasure of imitating nature, a “relative pleasure,” the human being 
should feel what comes from himself, from his spirit. (HEGEL, 1988, p. 27) Thus, the philosopher says: 
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The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born again, and the higher the spirit 
and its productions stand above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the 
beauty of art above that of nature.  
[...]  
But what is higher about the spirit and its artistic beauty is not something merely 
relative in comparison with nature. On the contrary, the spirit is alone the true, 
comprehending everything in itself, so that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only 
as sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it. In this sense, the beauty of 
nature only as a reflection of the beauty that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect, 
incomplete mode [of beauty], a mode which in its substance is contained in the spirit 
itself. (HEGEL, 1988, p. 2) 
 
Thus, the more the pictographic and poetic arts distanced themselves, the more each other’s 
independence naturally increased. In the 19th century, it was possible to verify that, in painting, a real 
exorcism of literary elements starts in its creative process: it begins with Impressionism and culminates 
in abstract and conceptual artwork or both. Through the break with the orthodox tradition of language 
and textuality (iconography), painters of different modernist tendencies focused on developing the 
purely visual. (SCHØLLHAMMER, 2001) 
Simultaneously with the breaking of the mimetic domain in art, there is a detachment of the 
artistic work from the models pre-established by the iconological and emblematic treatises. These were 
overlooked, resulting in the fact that the 17th-century artistic creation, for example, was considered 
obscure and full of polluting and unnecessary details. However, what was deemed superfluous to this 
artistic work would correspond to the lack of knowledge of its codification, that is, the evident diachronic 
cultural vacuum.  
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To illustrate the ostracism to which these artistic works have been relegated, let us take as an 
example the work Mary Magdalene by the Spanish sculptor Pedro de Mena (fig. 1). It is possible to 
compare it to others whose thematic object represents Mary Magdalene and to visualize its different 




2 The iconological fading 
 
  Before Pedro de Mena’s work, one can have the impression of facing a unique and original 
representation. However, if we compare it with others from the same period, it is possible to verify 
similarities among his contemporaries due to certain regularities with which the period’s artists 
addressed similar themes. Thus, it appears that these works were neither singular nor original; after all, 
specific rules of representation were followed, defined by pre-established manuals and treaties, which 
resulted in similar artistic works: the features of the represented were modified, not the representation 
mode. (BRANDÃO, 2010a) 
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 With the fading and disappearance of the rhetorical precepts that governed the 16th, 17th, and 
18th centuries, the use of certain iconic elements widely used in that period would pass to the later 
centuries or be ignored or used as a mere pictorial “adornment,” as seen with the use of the skull in 
figure 3. 
 In the Renaissance sculptural work by the Italian sculptor Donatello (fig. 2), Mary Magdalene is 
presented as an old woman “With a haggard face, clothed in unfortunate and poor clothes (...), gazing 
intently at the Heavens1” (RIPA, 2007, p. 190); which, in an iconological reading, would represent, in 
Cesare Ripa’s Iconology, a sign of “Penance.” 
However, her hands, unlike Mena’s work, are together so that they can indicate, according to 
the current iconology: 
a) The “Third Blessedness” (RIPA, 2007, p. 150) from Gospel: “Blessed are you who are 
weeping now: you shall laugh” (Lk 6, 21b), and 
b) “Spiritual Meditation” because “With the hands together, one against the other, thus 
symbolizing the effect of devotion and humility found in people, continuing and exercising in this way, 
the measure and scope of Spiritual Meditation” (RIPA, 2007, p. 64). 
c) On the other hand, the desolate aspect of the image could also lead the 17th-century reader 
to read it even as an indication of “Melancholia”: 
 
An older woman, unfortunate and in pain, dressed in coarse cloth and without any 
ornament. […]. 
She portrays herself as an older woman because the young people are usually the 
happiest, and the old, on the contrary, melancholic, as Virgil says […]. 
She is poorly dressed and lacking in adornment, like trees, when they are seen 
without leaves and fruit; she never lifts her spirits to the melancholic to the point of 
procuring the necessary comforts to provide or avoid the evils that she imagines 
haunt her2 (RIPA, 2007, p. 65). 
 
The same cannot be said of Magdalene of the Italian sculptor Antonio Canova (fig. 3), portrayed 
as a young, beautiful, and sensual woman who, sitting on her legs, poses in an attitude our view, of 
adoration, of surrender, of prayer. However, her body’s disposition and gestures would not correspond 
to the actions listed, according to the iconological models from the 16th to the 18th centuries. 
When representing “Prayer,” a woman was painted “kneeling and with open arms to show the 
reverence that one should have towards God, and in a particular way if one were praying3” (RIPA, 
2007, p. 160) 
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The attitude of keeping arms open, demonstrating prayer is ancient, and there are several 
examples in the proto-Christian world: the church of Saints John and Paul, in Rome (4th century); the 
image of Proculus in the catacomb of Saint Januarius, in Naples (5th century); the mosaic of the 
entrance to the church of Saint Demetrius in Thessaloniki (6th century); the mural painting at the 
Monastery of Saint Jeremiah, in Saqqara, Egypt (7th century), among others. (BELTING, 2009) 
In addition to open arms, the head should be facing the sky, which differs from Canova’s 
sculpture: 
 
Raising the head, looking towards the light that we said before, clearly shows us [...] 
that Prayer does not come to consist but in a particular elevation or sublimity of the 
mind and excitement of our affection, so that man [...] is sincere with God […]1 






1 “[...] El llevar levantada la cabeza, mirando hacia la luz que antes dijimos, claramente nos muestra […], que la Oración no 
viene a consistir sino en cierta elevación o sublimidad de la mente y excitación de nuestro afecto, de manera que el hombre 
[…] se sincera con Dios […]. 
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The 17th-century readers, for example, might even read Magdalene’s eyes down as a sign of 
humility: “Woman in white clothes; her eyes are lowered while holding a tender little lamb in her arm. 
[…] She must be dressed in a sack while trampling on some very valuable-looking clothes”2 (RIPA, 
2007, p. 499). 
It is even possible to verify that Magdalene by Canova has a dress girded by a rope similar to 
that by Pedro Mena and that she is on few clothes: but sitting on her legs would not show the proper 
“reverence to be had towards God3” (RIPA, 2007, p. 160). 











2 “[...]Mujer con traje blanco; lleva los ojos bajos, mientras sostiene en brazo un tierno Corderillo. [...] Ha de ir vestida de 
saco, mientras que pisote a algunas ropas de aspecto valiosísimo. 
3 “[...] reverencia que se debe tener para con Dios.” 
Figure 2 
Mary Magdalene in the Cave by Jules Josef Lefebvre, 1876. 
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The only visible sign that would refer to “Penance” would be the skull used as an ornament next 
to the young woman. According to the emblematic models, other essential elements – the cilice, the 
crucifix, and her knees – are absent.  
It can be seen that readers from the 19th century want to glimpse the plasticity of the work, are 
interested in its aesthetic beauty, its creativity, its subjectivity, in short, how the theme was approached. 
Times are already different, and even if the iconological elements appear, they will always be mere 
adornments, as in figure 4. Most of Francesco Hayez’s contemporaries will likely restrict their imagery 
reading to the pre-iconographical description or an iconographical analysis (PANOFSKY, 2004); 
however, they will hardly enter the iconological interpretation. That is because this referential, when lost, 
was covered by a canopy that covers a large part of its signal character, so it will no longer be possible 
to visualize the original idea nor imagine what the original conception of the work would have been like 
in Lefebvre’s image. 
From sacred – the representation of a saint from the Catholic Church – the image could become 
pagan, as it could represent any Greco-Roman deity. Here is the result of aesthetic freedom and 
creativity, whose choice is left to the artist, demonstrating that the power of creation is now in his hands. 
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The creative freedom and the possibility of experimentation in the arts’ realm would be 
unthinkable for the people of the 16th century. They were linked to μίμησις and under the influence of 
the iconologies that circulated in the period. This status quo represented an obstacle to creativity, at 
least along the lines propagated by Romanticism, because creative freedom was curtailed. Therefore, it 
does not surprise Schlegel and the German romantics’ stubbornness, for whom a free and creative 
subjectivity should produce art. They longed for a self that fled pre-established models, mere imitation, 
and turned to the individual, to the emotional. They, therefore, rejected the collective rationalism to 
which they were subjected.  
The 19th century freed itself from μίμησις, not from images. The imagery field increased beyond 
the emblematic genre’s borders and the iconologies and all the ancient traditions that accompanied 
them. If the images were previously connected to epistemological and paradigmatic models, now they 
were free to permeate unimaginable elements; after all, they entered the domain of pure creation 
(ποίησις). The reality is to create the non-real, as seen in contemporary art with the total rupture of the 
image-text relationship proposed since the Renaissance. Despite this rupture, some remains persisted, 
no longer as precepts to be obeyed, but under the artist’s direction and domain. 
In “The Life of Mary Magdalene” (fig. 6), Salvador Dalí mixes surreal elements with those of the 
Renaissance – the same found in the iconologies and the emblematic genre – revealed by this canvas’s 
figuration. However, he used them by choice, not by imposition. 
Therefore, when it is said that there was a break in the image-text interrelation, the 17th-century 
art driving principle, does not mean it ceased to exist, or it does not exist today. On the contrary, this 
relationship expanded explosively in the humanities so that the image, for some theorists as W. J. 
Thomas Mitchell, emerges as a paradigm within these exact sciences: 
 
the relationship between literature and image is no longer limited to literary work’s 
singular encounter with visual work. However, the broader perspective of studies on 
visibilities, visual culture, and the technological development of new forms of visual 
representation must be seen in the broader perspective of studies. 
(SCHØLLHAMMER, 2001, p. 31) 
 
 
3 The question of style 
 
In this way, we could infer, however paradoxical it may seem, that the liberation of painting 
concerning poetry (and vice versa) was momentary; that is to say, there was, in fact, a break with the 
old epistéme (επιστήμη): no longer looking for a faithful representation of nature, reality or, as the 
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German theorist Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht says: “the literary texts written today returned to present 
“worlds” to his readers.” (FARINACCIO, 2004, p. 11) 
Authors like Gabriel García Márquez (One Hundred Years of Solitude) or Umberto Eco (The 
Name of the Rose) described neither the typical reality of the Caribbean nor the real medieval world. 
They either proposed or claimed for themselves allegiance to any pre-existing referents (FARINACCIO, 
2004, p.12). Otherwise, the authors of the 17th century sought their model in the classics, for whom the 
work should be realistic, be based on the real without, however, worrying about history. After all, those 
authors were unaware of the idea of “historical forces” (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 33), perhaps because 
classic texts, such as those of Homer, always seem legendary, disconnected, unreal even though they 
are not entirely: 
 
[...] so long as we are reading or hearing the poems, it does not matter whether we know 
that all this is the only legend, “make-believe.” [...] Homer [...] does not need to base his 
story on historical reality, his reality is powerful enough in itself; it ensnares us, weaving its 
web around us, and that suffices him. And this “real” world into which we are lured, exists for 
itself, contains nothing but itself; the Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no 
teaching and no secret second meaning (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 13). 
 
Auerbach (2003) shows us, for example, the difference in focus between the Homeric and the 
biblical text: the former aimed at reality – through immediacy, fluidity, and narrative simplicity – while the 
latter aimed exclusively at “truth” due to its religious character and its claim “to represent universal 
history” (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 16). One text intends to “please” and “enchant” – such the Homeric –, 
while another to “indoctrinate” and “promise” – as the biblical, especially the Old Testament –, hence its 
obscure and metaphorical character (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 15) that will run through Antiquity and will 
be reused in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Baroque, as attested by the emblematic genre 
with its moralizing precepts. 
As we inherited, in the West, both Hellenic and Hebrew culture, we may be tempted to reverse 
the end to which each genre proposes, that is, we read “seriousness” and “reality” in a biblical text, or 
“doctrine” and “fantasy” in a classic; or, still, we believe to finding the “truth” in both. We will not get any 
of the proposals presented.  Even citing Auerbach (2003), this shows us that: 
 
In modern literature, the technique of imitation can evolve a serious, problematic, and 
tragic conception of any character regardless of the type and social standing, of any 
occurrence regardless of whether it be legendary, broadly political, or narrowly 
domestic; and in most cases, it actually does so. Precisely that is completely 
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This impossibility is due to the separation of styles; that is, for us, any question represented via 
literature or painting, regardless of whether the character conceived belongs to a high or low social 
class, can lead us to the commotion, to meditation. That would never happen with the ancients, for 
whom the representation 
  
[...] of everyday occupations and social classes – merchants, artisans, peasants, 
slaves – of everyday scenes and places-home, shop, field, store – of everyday 
customs and institutions – marriage, children, work, earning a living in short, of the 
people and its life (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 31). 
 
 could never literally be taken seriously, as they never “leave the realm of the comic” (AUERBACH, 
2003, p. 31). Such an individual would never have time in a society where there was a clear separation 
between what could be represented by the upper class and those considered inferior. Moreover, 
because there was no concept of the action of historical forces, people were seen from other values: the 
ancients were mainly interested in the moral problem – which would only reside in the aristocracy – 
therefore, the individual prevailed over the collective: 
 
No matter how many persons may be branded as given to vice or as ridiculous, 
criticism of vices and excesses poses the problem as one for the individual; 
consequently, social criticism never leads to a definition of the motive forces within 
society (AUERBACH, 2003, p. 32). 
 
That same separation extended to what they considered beautiful and ugly. The ugly and the 
grotesque (low style) were restricted to the lower classes; to the upper level, the beautiful and the 
virtuous (high style). In this regard, Bossuet, a 17th-century theologian, tells us: 
 
Thus a poet’s entire design, the entire aim of his labors, is that we, like his hero, 
should be in love with beautiful women [people], that we should serve them as if they 
were divinities; in a word, that we should sacrifice all to them, unless perhaps it be 
honor, the love of which is even more dangerous than love of beauty (AUERBACH, 
2003, p. 393). 
 
On the contrary, today, we can find truths and beauty in the words of a cook, a clerk, a waiter: 
these, regardless of who is being represented or starred, can be reached in the same way: the 
Hunchback of Notre Dame, despite his aspect, seems kind to us, it becomes beautiful, liable to produce 
pathos (πάθoς). For the classics, such a representation would be impossible; that is, Victor Hugo’s 
character would never lead them to the commotion but laughter. In the 19th century, a significant 
transformation of the previous model can be felt that would not be restricted only to the thematic realm 
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(the total breakdown of styles, for example), not even to the formation and representation of images the 
human eye and observation itself. 
 
 
4 Subjectivity and recognition of the world 
 
The human eye and observation would no longer be the same since the 19th century, and the 
prominent role for such changes ist due to photography, term/departure of a wave of transformations 
verified throughout that century. By the “term,” we mean that it was the threshold of transformations 
processed in the century of its appearance and the subsequent ones, the result of which was the 
change in how human beings see themselves and the world they are surrounded. According to 
Jonathan Crary (1992), these transformations would even lead to the prevailing Renaissance thought 
rupture, whose apex was the darkroom. 
Through that, a mimetic parameter par excellence, human interference in imagery production, 
was disregarded, thus submitting itself to the rigid physical laws of refraction and reflection, in whose 
power it would not be up to man to interfere, but only to accept it. Therefore, there was an external 
relationship between subject and object of observation; that is, the act of seeing is removed from the 
physical body of the observer: 
 
At the same time, another related and equally decisive function of the camera was to 
sunder the act of seeing from the physical body of the observer, to decorporealize 
vision. The monadic viewpoint of the individual is authenticated and legitimized by 
the camera obscura, but the observer’s physical and sensory experience is 
supplanted by the relations between a mechanical apparatus and a pre-given world 
of objective truth (CRARY, 1992, p. 39-40).  
 
Previously, the darkroom’s authority of itself did not allow the individual to interfere in the 
physical process of imagery creation due to the physical laws of the propagation of light; after all, the 
images that were projected on the dark background of the chamber were due to the effect of natural 
laws that were independent of the body contingent and changing man (FERRAZ, 2005). 
Nevertheless, since the Renaissance, the imputed rigidity to art, and the consequent use of 
mathematics and the exact sciences to explain the formation of the image (concepts of light, refraction, 
and reflection), new philosophical ideas began to modify this rationalist Weltanschauung towards the 
end of 18th century. As an example, we have the importance of subjectivity to recognize the world in 
which people are inserted. This search for subjectivity that sees, feels, and interferes in the vision as 
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something not merely external to the individual, could be seen, even in Kant, in his work “Critique of 
pure reason” (1787), when he affirms that “our representation of things as they are given to us does not 
conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform 
to our way of representing [...]” (KANT, 1998, p. 112). 
Still, according to the German philosopher, we know what is possible to pass through the sieve 
of our sensitivity, right through our gaze, without which it is ignored: 
 
[...] our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that 
we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so 
constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own 
subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all 
constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time 
themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, 
but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from 
all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are 
acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, 
and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it 
pertains to every human being (KANT, 1998, p. 185). 
 
                         Figure 7 – The geographer, by Jan van Vermeer, 1668  
 
 
Crary demonstrates, metaphorically, the importance of the darkroom in the period before the 
19th century, as in the 16th century, using two works by a well-known painter of the period, the Dutchman 
Jan van Vermeer, whose canvases The astronomer (1668) and The geographer (1668/69 - fig. 7) 
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represent the scholars who name them. Each of them, absorbed in their chores, locked up in their study 
environments, where we see objects that translate their trades: in one, there is a celestial globe; in 
other, nautical charts: 
 
Each has his eyes averted from the aperture that opens onto the outside. The 
exterior world is known not by direct sensory examination but through a mental 
survey of its “clear and distinct” representation within the room, the somber isolation 
of these meditative scholars within their walled interiors is not in at least an obstacle 
to apprehending the world outside, for the division between interiorized subject and 
the exterior world is a pre-given condition of knowledge about the latter (CRARY, 
1992, p. 46). 
 
Following, Crary shows us the relationship between the inner world and the external world. The 
study/work environment represents the former and the latter by the globe, maps, and nautical charts. 
The paintings, therefore, intended to show the reconciliation of the function of the darkroom, whose 
interior would be the interface between what Descartes considered as different terms: res cogitans and 
res extensa. The latter would be the domain of matter, the outside world’s visibility; the former, as the 
matter is visualized from each one’s individuality by the mind’s field and the spirit. Through the light that 
enters the internal environment – similar to the hole through which the light penetrates the interior of the 
darkroom – the scholar can get to know the external world, represented by maps, letters, images, 
across the globe, without having to leave its enclosure: one has access, therefore, to a projection of the 
world, interacts with it without being able to interfere in it, without being able to modify it, in a passive 
attitude in the face of the dazzle of the world formed internally. His attitude is one of mere 
contemplation, although palpable, of reality: one is facing the outside world represented by the star 
globe, by nautical charts, by maps; in short, res extensa, but this contemplation is only possible 
because his mind interferes in the process, a res cogitans, hence the non-reconciliation between the 
two Cartesian terms that the darkroom breaks: 
 
The production of the camera is always a projection onto a two-dimensional surface 
– here maps, globes, charts, and images. Each of the thinkers, in a rapt stillness, 
ponders that crucial feature of the world, its extension, so mysteriously unlike the 
unextended immediacy of their own thoughts yet rendered intelligible to mind by 
clarity of these representations, by magnitudinal relations (CRARY, 1992, p. 46). 
 
Goethe (1810), in turn, also calls into question – based on the work “Zur Farbenlehre” – this 
distancing relationship between man and the world provided by the darkroom, proposing a simple 
experience, from which the emptying of the classical system and epistéme that jettisoned the body 
image: 
 
ISSN: 2317-2347 – v. 10, n. 1 (2021) 






Let a room be made as dark as possible; let there be a circular opening in the 
windowshutter about three inches in diameter, which may be closed or not at 
pleasure. The sun being suffered to shine through this on a white surface, let the 
spectator from some little distance fix his eyes on the bright circle thus admitted. The 
hole being then closed, let him look towards the darkest part of the room; a circular 
image will now be seen to float before him. The middle of this circle will appear 
bright, colorless, or somewhat yellow, but the border will at the same moment appear 
red (GOETHE, 1840, p.16). 
 
Goethe shows us that when the orifice of the chamber is closed, the eyes see in the darkness 
because they will see several images of different colors, coming no longer from the light rays external to 
the body, but from the body itself: 
 
After a time, this red, increasing towards the center, covers the whole circle, and at 
last, the bright central point. However, no sooner is the entire circle red than the edge 
begins to be blue and the blue gradually encroaches inwards on the red. When the 
whole is blue, the edge becomes dark and colorless. This darker edge again slowly 
encroaches on the blue till the whole circle appears colorless. The image then 
becomes gradually fainter, and at the same time, diminishes in size. Here again, we 
see how the retina recovers itself by a succession of vibrations after the powerful 
external impression it received (GOETHE, 1840, p. 16-17). 
 
Observations demonstrate that it is no longer physics, nor mathematical and external logic to 
the human being that preside over vision, but the eye itself with its inherent physiology that perceives 
the world itself, no longer as an imposed external reality, without its effective participation: 
 
When the production of images itself can be disconnected from an external, fixed, 
stable, secure “world,” the certainties concerning both the subject and the object 
were simultaneously destabilized; in the same gesture, the processes of perception 
and knowledge are necessarily the target of experimentation, observation, 
description, and science (FERRAZ, 2005, p. 50). 
 
For this, it is necessary the participation of the “I” observer who will effectively engage  in the 
construction of images, no longer passively but actively. That is why Crary states, based on the 
concepts addressed by Goethe, that: 
 
The corporeal subjectivity of the observer, which was a priori excluded from the 
concept of camara obscura, suddently becomes the site on which an observer is 
possible. The human body, in all its contingency and specificity generates “the 
spectrum of another color”, and thus becomes the active producer of optical 
experience (CRARY, 1992, p. 69). 
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A significant knowledge/development of optical physiology is seen since, from the stereoscope4, 
the body becomes an intrinsic component of the machine itself. Through the optical instrument, the 
person has a binocular’s vision and three-dimensional from the object. Because of this participation, 
looking is not more just a passive act, from a mere spectator of the scene/image like that conceived in 
the classical theater, becomes active: “someone who sees within the scope of a set of possibilities, 
someone who is constrained by a system of conventions and limitations” (MACHADO, 2002, p. 229). 
The stereoscopic image, therefore, breaks with the Renaissance perspective from a single vanishing 
point, 
Consequently, it modifies the traditional concept of “point of view,” that is, that 
particular relationship of an observer with the object of his vision, around which 
meaning has been established for centuries. There being no vanishing point or 
unique point of view, there is also no hegemony of a unilocular perspective code, like 
the one that guided all Western history from the 15th century onwards (MACHADO, 
2002, p. 230-231). 
 
5 The role of photography in the new perception 
 
At that moment, it is necessary to return to what has been said concerning the paradox of the 
rupture of the pictorial and poetic genres so that we can continue this study, whose vertex is, precisely, 
photography. We could infer that this rupture did not happen entirely, but similar to pre-Avant-gardism, 
since it was, at first, only a change of direction. For example, for the avant-garde concretization, a 
period of commencement (as seen in figures 3, 4, and 5) was necessary. This stage was indispensable 
for there to be a break - in an abrupt and revolutionary way (fig. 6) - with the status quo, allowing the 
painting to know, in a more profound way, its object of study or use - the colors, the light, and the 
shadows. Something similar occurred with the literature and its relationship with words, syntax, and 
metrics. That made it possible for both of them to explore, in themselves, all the potential aesthetic 
possibilities, including using elements of the iconology itself, as Dalí probably did, not in an imposing 
way, but as paradigms to be used.  
 
4 An optical instrument that allows you to see relief effects in flat images, from photographs (or drawings) obtained from the 
same object, taken from slightly different positions, whose separation may be similar to that between the eyes, thus allowing 
a vision binocular and the perception of the three-dimensionality of objects. The image that forms on each eye's retina is flat, 
but as there is, a small difference between them and the eyes are separated by 5 to 8 centimeters. The brain takes care of 
"merging" these two images into one, resulting in the three-dimensional effect. This three-dimensional effect can be 
simulated, even without the device, using two slightly different flat figures, such as those that would be projected on each 
retina, separately. Only, in this case, the eyes themselves must take charge of "mixing" the images before sending them to 
the brain. Thus, it is necessary to make the eyes converge to obtain an impression on the retinas that combine the figures' 
two flat images. However, some people find it challenging to do this since they cannot make this forced "change their eyes" 
movement. In these cases, the stereoscope's use solves the problem since it projects a different image in each eye, 
eliminating the need to force them to converge. 
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Evidently, in the 19th century, this movement was incipient. That would not yet be when we 
would see the total break with the old models, because what was glimpsed, effectively, was the short 
time of freedom that both aesthetics – writing and pictorial – had one concerning the other; after all, we 
saw an exchange of axis with the entry of a third element that not only intervenes in both but also 
influences them: the photography. In this way, poetry concerning painting was not vacant for a long 
time, and the reverse painting as a model of poetry (PRAZ, 1982, p. 4)5. 
It is possible to verify that, even in the 19th century, photography took on the role that belonged 
to painting in previous centuries because the new technique, “far from opposing all pictorial tradition, did 
nothing but bet on its perpetuation, as it petrifies the archetypes that support it” (MACHADO, 2002, p. 
150). 
However, even so, its space was being conquered and, unlike the previous model, no longer as 
a paradigm to be followed and emulated, but as a new option to portray nature in an apparently precise 
and highly mimetic way6, when the τέχυη human acts without the need for human hands, creating a 
technical painting or technical art par excellence. 
Therefore, this displacement of poetry/painting           poetry/photography would be a natural 
consequence of human advancement and the use of its τέχυη, so we must observe that: 
a) in the first relationship (poetry/painting), whose guiding principle was μίμησις, iconologies 
were used, the image (pictorial and sculptural) was subject to the tutelage of the λόγος that directed 
them. Thus, there was a one-way street: from iconologies (including emblem books) to artistic work 
(painting, sculpture, poetry). The artists – mere technítes (τεχυίτης) –, had no room for creativity, 
whose concept was unknown to him; 
b) in the other relationship (poetry/photography), the mimetic germ disappears, although the 
photograph is, a priori, mimetic par excellence. Iconophotologies are used; however, they do not exist in 
themselves as compilations to be observed, studied, and/or used, but as an individual collection built 
over the years by a person in a particular community (BRANDÃO, 2010b, p. 94-97). There is, therefore, 
a two-way street: since the artist can start from both nature and himself, from his inner iconophotological 
collection, that is, from the photographic images that permeate his memory. The choice is no longer an 
imposition; it depends on his creativity, intention, and whom he wants to reach. 
 
5 Praz says (1982): “The degree of prestige achieved by Painting, thanks to the great Italian masters of the Renaissance, 
gave rise to the achievement of a victory over its sister art, Poetry; witness to the tireless efforts of poets to emulate painters 
in the sensuality of their descriptions ”(p. 4). 
6 We will see that it was only in the early days of photography that this happened since the possibility of retouching and 
modifying the “mimetically perfect” was later verified. 
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Evidently, in these two relationships, such principles also extend to their respective readers. If 
we are dealing with the epistemological model in which the Baroque was inserted, readers of the period 
had to have access to the cognitive key (sign keys) to understand the period’s works, without which it 
would be impossible apprehend what their authors intended. That becomes clear when such works and 
their authors were considered obscure or incomprehensible in later periods; therefore, readers of later 
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